Duquesne Law Review
Volume 18

Number 4

Article 13

1980

Book Review
Cornelius F. Murphy Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cornelius F. Murphy Jr., Book Review, 18 Duq. L. Rev. 1019 (1980).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol18/iss4/13

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Book Review
By Frederick K.
Beutel. Bielefeld, West Germany: Gieseking, 1975. Pp. 404. Cloth,
$34.00; Paperback, $29.00.
EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE SCIENSTATE.

I.
Modern jurisprudence is moving on an abstract plane. The works of
John Rawls' and Ronald Dworkin' are characteristic of this tendency,
motivated by the contributions which moral philosophy can make to
juristic theory. It is easy to forget that the predominant work in
American jurisprudence during this century was based upon a very
different orientation. It had sought to discover the connection between
legal theory and concrete realities. The labors of Pound, Cardozo, and
the Legal Realists,3 were fundamentally different from that of our contemporaries. They understood law as an instrument of social control.
They believed that to be authoritative, the legal system must mediate
the conflicts and tensions which characterize life in an urban, industrial
society. They were pragmatic where contemporary jurists tend toward
idealism. The earlier realism was also motivated by visions of the
good. By articulating jural postulates and systemizing social interests,
Pound' sought to bring qualities of civilized existence to the policy
judgments of judges and legislators.
The present work by Professor Beutel reflects concerns which bring
it within the sociological, tradition of American jurisprudence. Like
Pound, Beutel understands law as a social process. His concept of
1.
2.

J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L.

REV. 1057 (1975).
3. Roscoe Pound (1870-1964) began to develop his sociological jurisprudence at the
turn of the century with criticisms of the effectiveness of the administration of justice in
America. His work culminated with his magnum opus, Jurisprudence (5 vols.) (1959),
published shortly before his death. See Patterson, Roscoe Pound on Jurisprudence, 60
COLUM. L. REV. 1124 (1960). For a general study see D. WIGDON, ROSCOE POUND:
PHILOSOPHER OF LAW (1974). Earlier evaluations of Pound can be found in E. PATTERSON,
JURISPRUDENCE, Ch. 18 (1953) [hereinafter cited as PATTERSON], and J. STONE, HUMAN LAW
AND HUMAN JUSTICE, Ch. 9 (1965) [hereinafter cited as STONE]. Benjamin N. Cardozo
(1870-1938), who was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, is best
known for his three books on the judicial process: The Nature of the Judicial Process
(1921); The Growth of the Law (1924); and Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928). There are
studies of both Cardozo and of American Legal Realism in PATTERSON, supra.
4. See I & III R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE, Ch. 6 & 14 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
JURISPRUDENCE]; PATTERSON, supra note 3, at §§ 4.60-.61; STONE, note 3 supra.
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society is, however, more developed. In Experimental Jurisprudence
and the Scienstate concern is centered upon the role of law in a highly
technological, industrial society. And in this work Professor Beutel advances a conception of the good which differs profoundly not only from
his predecessors but from that of contemporary legal philosophy. It is
his contention that the jural problems of a common social life are of
such magnitude that their adjustment is beyond the competency of
judges and politicians. Their decisions are guided by arbitrary emotional preferences. A technological .civilization-which accommodates
scientific discovery to public needs-can arise only if the instruments
of social control pass into the hands of those capable of addressing
those problems through the process of hypothesis and verification
which characterizes the scientific discipline.
Government, so transformed, becomes a Scienstate.' Under such a
regime, when the techniques of systems engineering are fully in place,
the moral dogmatism which now generates conflict will give way to the
scientific and rational development of the race. The Scienstate thesis
differs considerably from its sociological progeny. It is more imaginative, part of the genre of scientific utopianism.' And it also draws
its inspiration from some common assumptions of the modern world.
Professor Beutel is a child of the Enlightenment. He rails against
the obscurantism of religion and traditional morality and denounces
the pernicious, reactionary consequences which they have had upon
material progress. In legal administration, judges and lawyers are execrated for extending into secular life the machinations of a priest
craft. Reverence for precedent, ritual, and verbal manipulation are the
modern counterparts of the dogmatic theological inflexibility which rationalism was designed to overthrow.
The passion with which Professor Beutel attacks religion seems incongruous in this tolerant age. The author writes out of deep conviction and does make some telling points. It is probable, as he asserts,
that an uncritical extension of principles of personal responsibility in
the law of torts obstructed the development of an adequate automobile
accident system. There are other illustrations of the gaps between
moral principle and social need.' But the wider claim, that religion and
morality are essential negative influences, is untenable. The modern
administration of justice is greatly enhanced by principles of equitable
administration whose origins are canonical. Further, Buetel's general
thesis is contradicted by modern scholarship. Christopher Dawson has
5.

F.

BEUTEL, EXPERIMENTAL

JURISPRUDENCE

AND

THE SCIENSTATE,

(1975) [hereinafter cited as EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE].
6. E.g., H.G. WELLS, A MODERN UTOPIA (1930).
7.

EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE, Supra

note 5, Ch. I.

Ch. IX & X
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shown that religion is a source of creative activity and that it has
played an important role in the development of human culture.8 To
split law and religion into two spheres-one public, the other privateneglects the contexts in which legal rules are expressed. As a living
process, law shares with religion transrational values which involve
the whole human person.'
If Beutel's wider claim is untenable, it nevertheless retains a certain
critical importance. The rising influence of Islamic religion upon the
legal systems of the Moslem world is, at best, a mixed blessing. As a
nation, we have been victimized by that spirit of intolerance and emotional fanaticism which the author identifies as a regressive factor in
the development of civilization. And on a related front he, like B. F.
Skinner,'" does the academic community a service by pointing out the
emotional roots of many of the claims made on behalf of human dignity. Whether the scientific criterion of the true and good is satisfactory
is the more serious question which is raised by this provocative book.
II.
One way of understanding law is to view it in terms of utility. A law
may be judged to be useful if it promotes the greatest good of the
greatest number. Pragmatically, its usefulness is judged by the reaction of those subject to the rule. Adopting the latter definition," Professor Beutel offers an experimental jurisprudence to resolve the most
pressing problems of the lawmaker. He must know whether the law
satisfies the demands which caused its enactment and its effects upon
the whole legal system as well as the general public. The effectiveness
of legal norms is of central importance to a legal system. The author
here highlights some of the more subtle aspects of good legal administration. His insights can be extended, for empirical research has a
much broader range of potential application than is commonly appreciated. Criminal convictions are frequently reversed by appellate
courts upon the assumption that the accused is subject to retrial. How
often does that in fact occur? And if the percentage of retrials should
prove to be slight, what effect should such facts have upon the procedural rules?
8.

C.

9.

See H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974). Berman's study is

DAWSON,

PROGRESS AND RELIGION

(1960).

cited by Beutel, see EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 7, at 12 n.5, but is not
evaluated.
10. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1972).
11. Beutel's work more closely resembles the instrumentalism of John Dewey than
the pragmatism associated with the Jamesian tradition. This is especially true with
respect to the scientific method. See C. MURPHY, MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 66-76 (1978).
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The experimental method is also offered as a solution to the
sociological problem of interests. Pound's method provided for the
identification and classification of the de facto claims and demands
which individuals or groups make upon the legal order." Beutel would
separate needs from demands. The former are subject to objective
verification; the latter are the arbitrary desires of individuals. What
are needs? The offered definition is unclear," but it is probable that he
has in mind-the elementary requirements of food, clothing, shelter, as
well as the exigencies of living in a complex society. They are interests
which all would want satisfied. Transportation is illustrative. Its value
is not controversial. It can be taken for granted by the social engineer
responsible for devising an adequate traffic pattern. But the scientific
method can also be applied to areas of life where the issue of values is
more complex. It contributed to the sterilization of Carrie Buck" as
well as vehicular control in New Haven. Beutel argues that the responsibilities for perverse policies lies with the legislators rather than the
scientists. 1 But he does not see how some of the philosophical principles which he endorses implicate the experimental jurists in the applications of their method.
The familiar distinction between is and ought expresses the difference between scientific and valuational propositions.16 But, as the
work of Lasswell and McDougal has demonstrated, human values are
implicit in any decisional context. Dignity, personality, and human
nature are elements of the problem to be solved. And when the scientist is the problem solver his conception of human values is critical.
For now he has passed from observation to the experimental phase of
science. He is exercising a power of control over the subject matter.
The author adopts the belief that the meaning of man, even in terms
12.
13.

III JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, Ch. 14.
The definition which Beutel posits is as follows:
Needs are a third class of interests or wants which play the most important
part. They might be said to be those conditions or things in the current state of
society which, if present and effective, would cause the individual or society to
function with the least friction and more in accordance with the natural order of his
or its universe at that moment. Needs clearly change with changing conditions in
society. Primitive man needs no automobiles, airplanes, machine tools or universities, but modern American society could not exist without them.
EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 99-100.
14. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Considerable public interest in the subject of involuntary sterilization has been generated by a series of articles on the Virginia laws commencing in February, 1980, in the Richmond Times-Dispatch.
15. The standard case is the responsibility of scientists in the development of the
atomic bomb. See EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, Ch. XIV.
16. For a discussion of scientific ethics, see PATTERSON, supra note 3, § 4.54. See also
E. PATTERSON, LAW IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE (1963).
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of ultimate life, is subject to scientific cognition. Following Skinner, he
assumes that the dogma of free will had been disproven. He also
assumes that such speculative questions are irrelevant. Recent legal
developments, however, have demonstrated that the issues cannot be
avoided. It is not pointless, as he suggests, whether or not man is
understood in mechanistic terms. The de facto accomplishments of
modern surgery (to use his illustration) are not, of themselves, a
justification for a legally sanctioned lobotomy. That psychosurgery
presents a threat to human nature is a fact generally being recognized
by members of the scientific community as well as ethicians."
Confidence in a purely scientific understanding of human nature is
generated not only by the marvels of scientific discovery but also
because of the exaggerated belief that science, and science alone, is
capable of understanding the subject. We now have sufficient experience to see the dangers implicit in such an assumption. We need to
also understand how such a mental outlook can cripple our capacity to
deal effectively with jural problems. We are told that, in the future,
experimental jurists may find that parental love and family life are
essential virtues. Yet the very tentativeness with which these ideals
are held impedes their effective implementation in areas where they
are important, such as juvenile law. 8 It is not only the lack of conviction which here impedes progress. It is a failure to see that the scientific method has a role to play in confirming as well as discovering
values. And this deeper failure is traceable to the cognitive assumptions
which, in an extreme form, characterize scientific instrumentalism.
In spite of these shortcomings, scientific proof remains an integral
part of modern legal and political decisionmaking. Its relevance to fair
judgment in the area of products liability will become increasingly important in the future. In matters such as the Love Canal Controversy,
the balance between personal apprehension and real damage may have
been struck differently if the available scientific evidence was given
better credence by the responsible public officials. We are indebted to
Professor Beutel for having stimulated reflection on such issues
through this book which is his magnum opus.
Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr.*
17. See 13 DuQ. L. REV. 673-936 (1975) (symposium on medical experimentation).
18. Compare the criticism of Beutel's earlier work. Schuman, 56 MICH. L. REV. 477,
479 (1958) (review of F. BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALS OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS A
NEW BRANCH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1957)).

*Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.

